The sociology of post-fordism has facilitated the development of a new welfarism which suggests that economic globalisation, labour market flexibility, more complex patterns of family life and the dissolution of traditional class structures require a new welfare settlement. Since full employment, redistribution and expensive universal services are no longer seen as feasible, the new welfare can only justify social spending as investment in human capital and as the enhancement of individual opportunities. Welfare states are all driven in the same direction by the imperatives of international competition.
A review of available evidence indicates that the progress of post-fordist social change is partial. Inequalities in life-chances have grown wider. Changes in patterns of employment and new legislation weaken the working class. The ruling class is well aware of its interests. Increases in productivity at a time when investment is not rising, the decline in union membership and militancy and the intensification of work coupled with a policy stance by both main parties that supports lower taxes, a shift in the tax burden downwards and a decline in state intervention all indicate that capital is in the ascendant in the UK. Comparative work shows that the policies pursued under different regimes can make a difference to welfare outcomes despite the increased stringency of competition. The traditional agenda of social policy -class inequality, the strength of capital and the policy programme of the nation-state -merits particular attention in Britain in the 1990s.
bid farewell to full employment as well as to universality, the 'welfare state' as a distinct phase in the evolution of social policy in the West will have come to an end. (1993, p. 36) This article reviews the analysis of social change influenced by the 'new sociology', considers its relevance to contemporary social policy issues and argues that, despite limitations, the simplicities and 'secondbest theories' of old welfarism may have merit in the current context. In particular, they remind us of continuities in the structuring of inequality and oppression which overenthusiastic celebration of diversity and opportunity tends to obscure.
A NA LYS E S O F S O C I A L C H A N G E
The topic of social change commands considerable attention not least among those who wish to suggest that modern industrial society is undergoing transition from modernism, fordism or industrialism to something else. Students of social policy often identify a sea-change in the welfare climate round about the oil crisis of the mid-1970s, marking a transition from the expansive social policy of 'welfare optimism' to the retrenchment of 'welfare pessimism' (George and Taylor-Gooby, 1996, ch. 1). The most influential theorist of comparative social policy argues that 'many of the assumptions that guided post-war welfare state construction in the advanced industrial world seem no longer to obtain ' (Esping-Andersen, 1994b, p. 1; see Offe, 1994, pp. 94-9) . A convenient approach is through the theoretical positions loosely described as 'post-fordism' and 'post-modernism'. These have been extensively discussed by other writers on social policy (Williams, 1992; Hewitt, 1994; Jessop, 1992; Burrows and Loader, 1994; Amin, 1994) and will be dealt with briefly.
Post-fordism
Post-fordist social science is concerned to identify the 'driving force' in 'a putative transition from one dominant phase of capitalist development in the post-war period to another 30 to 50 year cycle of development based on very different economic, social and political norms' (Amin, 1994, p. 3) . The core of post-fordism is economic transition: analysis starts out from the material basis of production and charts changes on four levels, in relation to work, markets, societal and political shifts. In relation to work, the new paradigm stresses the importance of changes in industrial and employment structures associated with the decline in importance of traditional manufacturing industry and the increasing significance of the service sector. Some writers suggest that these shifts are compounded by a move away from the assembly-line mass market model to more individualised short-run production approximating to a pre-industrial craft specialisation (e.g., Sabel, 1982) . In addition, new management practices coupled with the distinctive instability of the UK economy have led to increasing insecurity among those in full-time permanent employment, the dramatic rise in self-employment and the spread of part-time, casualised, or short-term contract work, sometimes termed 'flexibilisation' (Crompton, 1993, p. 83) .
The drift away from male assembly-line full-time permanent industrial employment as the paradigm of work, sometimes summed up under the label 'post-fordism', has implications stretching beyond the production system: 'Postwar fordism has to be seen…less as a mere system of mass-production and more as a total way of life' (Harvey, 1989, p. 135) . Perhaps the most convenient summary is provided by Lash and Urry (1987) . Mass production presupposes mass consumption and state regulation of economic activity through neo-Keynesian management. In the post-fordist era, the guarantees of order and stability provided by nation, factory and family life no longer exert the authority they once held.
The second aspect of change is the increasing significance of modern communications for markets. Post-fordist writers tend to argue that the international economic order has become more 'globalised', pointing to the importance of international competition and the continuing trend to the extension of free trade pursued in the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations. An alternative view suggests that multinational power blocs are becoming increasingly important, for example the EU or Canada, US and Mexico. From the viewpoint of the individual or the firm these changes are equally likely to make economic life more uncertain since there is a wider range of alternative suppliers operating under more varied conditions of quality control and production cost for any activity. At a political level, there are important differences in the extent to which the two approaches imply that the world market is subject to political control.
The third aspect of post-fordism concerns the way in which economic changes mesh with social changes. If the model of society centred on the significance of the typically male household wage earnerthe welfare state's 'erstwhile model family' in Esping-Andersen's analysis (1994b, p. 7) -no longer carries conviction, changes in family life must be taken into account. Over the postwar period the number of women in employment has increased rapidly, so that it is now the norm for those with a child under five to be economically active (over a half as against a quarter in the early 1970s -Hills, 1993, fig. 24 ). On the one hand, patterns of family life are becoming more complex, with over half of marriages in the UK ending in divorce and a sharp increase in the number of one parent families and of single person households (EU, 1995a, pp. 48, 49) . On the other, consumption, rather than the dependency/authority presupposed in the notion of a family wage, becomes the core of family life. Ray Pahl neatly sums up the change: 'if the symbol of the nineteenth century city was the factory chimney, the equivalent symbol at the end of the twentieth century in Europe and North America is surely the shopping mall ' (1989, pp. 718-19) .
At the political level, changes in the experience of work and of economic relationships feed through into shifts in political consciousness. As Beck argues, 'there are increasing inequalities, but class inequalities and class-consciousness have lost their central position in society' (Beck et al., 1994, p. 8) . Certainly, those political scientists who wish to argue for the continuing significance of social class as a correlate of voting behaviour can do so only by shifting to a different definition of class and at the cost of pointing out that over the past quarter century, over twofifths of the electorate did not vote for the party of their class: 'there was a fall in relative class voting between 1964 and 1970 and there has been subsequently no continuous trend' (Heath et al., 1994, p. 283) .
Post-fordist approaches stress the growing significance of the 'new social movements' alongside the decline in the importance of class in the political arena. These movements are distinguished by three factors: relatively decentralised organisation; focus on particular interests rather than more general struggles; and concern with conflicts across political rather than economic boundaries -between the 'people' or citizens against the state rather than between labour and capital. Ecological interests, women's issues, ethnic minority groupings, people with housing needs and many other interests seek to influence policy making (see, e.g., Lash and Urry, 1987, p. 16) . Such struggles may cross-cut class struggles and may interact with each other in complex ways allowing the possibility of progressive alliances. They can be analysed from a Marxist or a social democratic perspective (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Pierson, 1991, ch. 3) . They have in common a rejection of the 'productivist' basis of traditional politics (Offe, 1994, pp. 91-5) .
Post-modernism
Post-fordism starts out from economic shifts and adds to these changes in social organisation that lead to a restructuring of interests and of possibilities for most people. It adopts a materialist perspective, arguing that new social and ideological relations stem from changes in the sphere of work. The result is a fundamental realignment of political and social relationships. The existing form of welfare provision is seen as obsolete because it is inappropriate to the new patterns of need and because it can no longer command support among the new patterns of political interest. Diversity and flexibility rather than the structures of family, state and class are the determining themes of social life.
Post-modernism is an idealism. It situates economic and social changes in a broader theory of the development of dominant currents in ideas which links the shifts, reviewed above, with a reordering at the level of social theory and social experience that influences virtually every area of social life. The starting point is at the level of ideas. Modernity is characterised by the critical scepticism that erodes confidence in every traditional source of authority, in claims to technical expertise and ultimately in any attempt to produce what Lyotard (1984) terms 'grand narratives' -over-arching normative or analytic theory -for example, in social science, the ideologies of laissez-faire, Marxism, Keynesianism or democratic socialism. This has two results. At the level of theory there is no refuge from scepticism. At the level of social life, the individual cannot escape an awareness that it is a perpetually open question whether particular structures of nation, class or party serve their own interests. Modern society becomes the snake that eats its own tail.
Once critique is combined with mass education and cheap communications, social life becomes reflexive, 'a theme and problem for itself ' in Beck's words (Beck et al., 1994, p. 8) . The possibility that things could be otherwise and that the way they are is not necessarily best or in our own interests is continually with us. At the same time, there is no possibility of insulating a holistic theory, such as laissez-faire or socialism, from such scepticism. The result is a shift to a social experience characterised by the collapse of confidence in tradition, by diversity and fragmentation, strong on choice and weak on stable criteria for the evaluation of choice. Such an approach does not of course deny the importance of expertise -of growing significance as technology advances. The point is that individuals can no longer place a blind 'traditional' faith in the superior wisdom of the accredited expert. Trust must be active -the individual must engage in evaluating the merits of competing wisdoms, and such judgement is perpetually subject to revision.
Post-modernism adds a peculiar ineluctability to the arguments of post-fordism. The latter points to a social world of greater diversity and uncertainty, in which the stable structures and alliances which supported individual life become fragmented. Post-modernism argues that such a condition is inescapable once enlightenment has removed all fetters from intellectual critique. The only alternative is a denial of the power of reason -a retreat to fundamentalism (Gellner, 1992, p. 1) . This implies that a social policy which claims to identify basic human needs and organise universal or at least society-wide services to meet them is assuming the authority of some comprehensive grand narrative of need and citizenship where none can exist. Such an approach will find that the only social basis for support is force of habit, and that particularist interests will gradually withdraw. It can have no future.
The new sociology stresses diversity. Interestingly, the response of social policy arguments is to move in the direction of convergence rather than division. This is because the traditional basis of divisions in this area -the ideological split between left and right -exerts a declining purchase in the way suggested by the post-modern critique of the claims of prescriptive social theory. Basing policy in the diversity of individual interests tends to lead different political programmes in a common direction, concerned to maximise the opportunities for the development of those interests.
The main opposition party in the UK has shifted from a socialist to a social democratic programme, symbolised in the redrafting of clause four of its constitution which was generally understood to contain a commitment to nationalisation. While the party has not formally adopted a full social programme, the Commission on Social Justice which it sponsored lays out the groundwork in contrasting Levellers' and Investors' socialism. The latter is characterised by a concern with individual opportunity: 'the extension of economic opportunity is not only the source of economic prosperity but also the basis of social justice…the Investors achieve security by redistributing opportunity rather than just redistributing income ' (1994, p. 95) . This approach rather than a traditional labourist interest in a high-quality and expensive universalist welfare system has coloured recent policy pronouncements.
The role of government is less to tax and spend and more to provide opportunities for individual activity. However, there are real problems in reconciling this approach with the parallel claim that the programme will respect the equal worth of citizens. A rational investment strategy may well require the direction of training or of infrastructural spending to particular groups and areas. The concern about regional inequality in Europe following the publication of the Cecchini report (1988 -see, e.g., EU 1994a Bennington and Taylor, 1991, p. 121) suggests that there may be limits to how far a successful modern economy can support egalitarianism against market forces.
The programme of the Commission distinguishes itself from the social policy of laissez faire. However, in its concern with economic success in a market society, its emphasis on training and the role it leaves for the private sector, there are striking similarities with the proposals of the right. The main difference is in the implicit level of spending and in the commitment to the equal worth of all citizens. A careful examination of the policy programmes of the major parties in the UK concluded that: 'as the main political parties stand in the early 1990s and as they are likely to develop during this decade…the central assumptions of policy are largely shared…they do not stray beyond the bounds of what we have called the affordable welfare state'. This is characterised by commitment to market capitalism, the pursuit of low taxation (interesting in the second-lowest taxed country in the EU -OECD, 1994b, Table 1 ) and support for privatisation in many areas of welfare. The second conclusion is that this system 'will gradually decline into a residual welfare state, as much by default, through inadequate funding, as through deliberate policy' (George and Miller, 1994, pp. 216-18) .
The report of the Commission on Social Justice is written from a social democratic perspective. Part of its importance lies in the fact that the general features of its approach are also reflected in recent documents from international agencies. The OECD study New Directions for Social Policy departs from the emphasis on retrenchment in previous work (e.g. Oxley and Martin, 1991) . It concludes: 'the role of social policy…is to provide a framework which enables the fullest participation possible in all aspects of society for its citizens -supporting them in their efforts to balance work, learning, care for dependants and leisure ' (1994a, p. 52) . The link between social and economic goals is again expressed in terms of investment. The first guiding principle is the recognition 'that many types of social expenditure are an investment in society which enhances its growth potential by providing services which help underpin the efficient operation of the market economy' (p. 52).
The EU social policy Green Paper sets out guiding principles which link social policy to 'the stable growth of output and jobs and to social and political stability' while recognising the importance of budgetary restraint and the significance of the mixed economy of welfare (EU, 1994a, p. 8) . The White Paper sees 'the key' to 'continuing social progress' as 'continuing productivity gains'. The foundation of progress is efficiency and the 'key resource will be a well-educated and highly motivated and adaptable working population…Progress cannot be founded simply on the basis of the competitiveness of economies but on the efficiency of European society as a whole' (1994b, para 5). The Action Plan echoes these sentiments: 'there cannot be social progress without competitiveness and economic growth ' (1995b, p. 2) .
The international expansion of markets emphasised by post-fordists brings home one of the central dilemmas of modern social policy: to maintain social spending, governments must support policies that aid economic competitiveness. The solution to squaring this particular circle is to argue that social policy itself is 'investment', is a contribution to efficiency. The problem is that once the justification for meeting needs moves outside the arena of human interests, policy interests become vulnerable to an external imperative. Some areas of social protection may seem much more closely linked to growth (for example, training), while others (such as social housing) may not.
F L E X I B I L I T Y: G A L B R A I T H V E R S U S H U T T O N
Post-fordism claims that flexibility sets the frame of modern economic life. However, there are strong indications of the continuing importance of divisions. In relation to the accounts of shifts in the labour market, it is true that the convergence theories of the 1960s and 1970s (the embourgeoisement thesis and the deskilling thesis) are difficult to sustain as social inequalities are drawn out and as work for many becomes more insecure. The evidence of the Essex class survey and British Household Panel Study shows that the long-run decline in the manual working class continued, from 41 per cent of the population in 1984 to 34.5 per cent in 1991 and 33.8 per cent in 1992, in line with the view that the division between manual and non-manual work is no longer a central axis of social division. The service and junior service classes continue to expand from 27 to 33 to 34 per cent, although, interestingly, the service class has recently fallen slightly in size within this total -perhaps an indication of the spread of insecurity in work to this group and of the trend to removing layers of middle management (Buck et al., 1994, pp. 173-4) .
The BHPS also attempted to explore the significance of flexible working practices in the labour market. The findings 'show that there is a relatively unstable sector of the labour market where job turnover is higher and some of the benefits of employment are lower' (Buck et al., p. 187) . However, while this sector is expanding it must be remembered that according to the BHPS figures, the group of those economically active not in permanent jobs is only about 10 per cent of the total, and that half of those on short-term contract work and a third of those in seasonal casual work moved into permanent jobs between the interviews in 1991 and in 1992. The TUC concluded that 'while temporary jobs account for about 7 per cent of all employees the growth of temporary work has not yet transformed the UK labour market' (1995a, p. 6). A recent briefing paper indicates that the growth of temporary work is highly sensitive to labour market recovery, and that the rise in temporary jobs may well have peaked between the winter of 1993/4 and 1994/5 (1995b, section 2.10). While there are substantial groups who lack jobs or security in employment, it is not clear that flexibility permeates the experience of work for the majority.
The question of what the shift to service sector employment, the growth of self-employment and the increased insecurity of work for some sectors of the community means for the social fabric can be tackled by contrasting two recent accounts. Galbraith in The Culture of Contentment, sums up the views of many writers who understand the developments of the last two decades as driven by an opposition between the satisfaction of a comfortable majority and the misery of a minority. 'Government…is accommodated not to reality or common need but to the beliefs of the contented, who are now the majority of those who vote' (1992, p. 10). Conversely, Will Hutton argues that the key to understanding The State We're In is the notion of a 40:30:30 society. Only a minority can see themselves as independent from the possibility of reliance on government provision. The middle group are in full-time work, but are continually subject to uncertainty. 'The unpredictability of their incomes leaves them at a disadvantage ' (1994, p. 193) . Those in the bottom 30 per cent are sub and un-employed. Their experience is of marginality and exclusion. This approach argues that the impact of insecurity permeates the whole of society: 'Not merely the economy but society has been 'marketised' with an increase in anxiety, dread of the future and communal breakdown. The impact is nearly universal ' (p. 197) .
Esping-Andersen charts growing income inequality, especially in the more liberal welfare state regimes: 'Earnings in the lowest decile lost ground, relative to the median, by 11 per cent in the United States, 14 per cent in the UK, 9 per cent in Canada and 5 per cent in Australia' (Esping-Andersen, 1994b, p. 14) . However, the evidence of the BHPS indicates that insecurity in employment has not yet attained the level where its consequences reach into the lives of the mass of the population. Similarly, the analyses of the most recent British Social Attitude survey shows that only about 20 per cent of the sample report that they find it difficult or very difficult to cope on their incomes, and a similar minority state that they expect their income to decline over the next year (Taylor-Gooby, 1995) . These proportions have not changed significantly since the survey started its annual round in the early 1980s. This evidence applies to richer countries. In the less-developed world the impact of economic restructuring, encouraged by international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund, may be to undermine secure employment on a far wider scale. Oxfam's 1995 Poverty Report states that over half of employment in Latin America is now casualised, as against 11 per cent in 1985 (Foot, 1995, p. 11) . Such evidence supports Galbraith against Hutton, so far as developed countries go.
There is some indication of an increase in the small number of women in service class occupations (from 4 to 8 per cent as against 13 to 18 per cent for men) implying that the success of some women in education is beginning to lead to entry to middle-class professional and managerial work (Buck et al., 1994, p. 176) . However, the conclusion of the major study of the 1980s (the Social Change and Economic Life Initiative of the ESRC) stresses stability rather than change: 'the common finding is one of remarkable continuity in patterns of gender segregation despite cyclical and structural changes' (MacEwan Scott, 1994, p. 5) . Continuity also appears to feed through into the allocation of earnings between partners within the home. Vogler and Pahl's analyses of SCELI data 'do not support the theory that "changes in labour market participation are leading to greater equality in household's financial arrangements '' ' (1993, p. 91) .
This brief examination of some recent data indicates that the suggestion that new patterns of insecurity and flexibility permeate working life and reach out into the rest of social experience may be misleading. The experience of insecurity is highly concentrated among particular groups who have always been most vulnerable in the labour market. These groups have certainly expanded in size and other groups have lost the confidence in secure employment they once enjoyed, but the division between mass and minority remains.
The idea of post-traditional society presents social science with 'a new agenda ' (Beck et al., 1994, p. 56 ) and post-modern fragmentation and risk society may well be on the horizon, but a fundamental transition has not yet taken place. The result is 'high modernity' -'a world where opportunity and danger are balanced in equal measure ' (1994, p. 58) . To move from the grand sociological perspective to the smaller compass of the direct concerns of social policy, there is evidence of a similar continuity in traditional structures of inequality, to do with market position and gender, to set alongside the model of diversity and the erosion of structure as the keynote of social life. It is particularly important for those interested in meeting social needs to bear this in mind since developments at the political level serve to reinforce the advantage of the more influential groups.
P O L I T I C S A N D D I V E R S I T Y
Post-fordism tends to stress the dissolution of some political structures but pays little attention to the significance and growing strength of others. Here developments at two levels are of interest, concerning the role of capital and the institutional structures of state decision-making.
The ascendancy of capital
One traditional social policy approach claims that the central structural division of Western society lies between capital and labour. The suggestion that a cohesive and self-conscious working class is no longer a major force shaping welfare development -if it ever was -has already been mentioned. Capital does not necessarily have a unitary interest. For example, the question of a structural division between finance and manufacturing capital has been much discussed (see Ingham, 1984) . However, it is possible to identify common interests which apply to capital as a whole. These must include the achievement of higher output for a given level of investment, greater control over labour and greater respect for the rights of ownership. All things being equal, higher output allows capital to increase its return and expand more rapidly. Control over labour enhances the security of capital in the deployment of any surplus. Greater autonomy for property has the same effect.
The output record of British industry compared to that of other nations has long been a cause for concern. A recent authoritative study showed that growth in business output in the UK during the 1960s and early 1970s was lower than in all other twenty-one OECD countries included except Sweden, at 3.5 per cent a year against an average of 5.4 per cent. It was again lower than all except Sweden, Switzerland and New Zealand between 1974 and 1979 (1.3 per cent against 2.7 per cent), but had improved to approach the average between 1980 and 1990 (2.6 per cent against 2.8 per cent) outstrip-ping the US, Germany, France and Italy (see Table 1 from Englander and Gurney, 1994, p. 115). As Ball et al. point out (1989, pp. 126-32) explanation of the shift is fraught with uncertainty. Changes may be due to increased investment, improvement in the quality or numbers of the workforce, better access to markets, new patterns of management or to other factors.
The OECD analysis indicates that the recent improvement in output was not associated with increased investment. The rate of capital formation in the UK in the 1980s was lower than in any other country studied except Iceland and the Netherlands. There is no obvious improvement in the quality of the workforce. Indeed, concern had been expressed throughout the period at the weakness of training programmes in the UK (Cutler, 1992) . The growth in employment (at 0.5 per cent against an average of 1.2 per cent) was lower than in any of the major countries except France. It is difficult to see how factors that might affect marketing such as the development of the European Economic Community or expanded access to Eastern European markets would apply differentially to the UK. The figures support the contention that capital in the UK has been successful in achieving greater output by making the workforce more productive without a major injection of investment. British workers certainly work longer than in other countries -at 43.3 hours, the longest working week in the EU, three hours longer than the average (CSO, 1995, Table 4 .15). Earlyretirement and stress-related illness are becoming more common. The BHPS reports a decrease in subjective well-being as measured by the Englander and A. Gurney (1994) , 'OECD productivity growth -medium-term trends', OECD Economic Studies, no. 22.
General Health Questionnaire over the short period 1991 to 1992. The decline is related particularly to the experience of unemployment (Buck et al., 1994, p. 209) . These changes may indicate greater intensification of work.
The direct control of capital over labour has also been enhanced. Developments in trade union law restricting the right to picket, to establish a closed shop, to engage in sympathetic industrial action and call strikes without a formal ballot and advance notification have also strengthened capital against labour. The power of ACAS to recommend union recognition has been removed. These changes may be linked to the decline in union membership. From a peak of 53 per cent of the civilian labour force in 1981, membership has fallen to about 32 per cent by 1992, the lowest level since records began in 1946 (CSO, 1995, Table 4 .21). The number of days lost in industrial disputes per year since 1989 has remained lower than in any previous year since records began in 1891. By 1994 it had declined to 278,000 (Department of Employment, 1995, Table 4 .1).
The enhanced authority of ownership is demonstrated in legislation such as the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act which strengthens the legal rights of property-owners against citizens. More broadly, the political commitments to reduce government economic intervention and to cut back the proportion of national product deployed by government through taxation coupled with policies that shift the tax burden downwards lead in the same direction. The tax policies are common to most advanced countries, but pursued with unusual vigour in the UK (e.g. Mitchell, 1993, pp. 4-6) .
Evidence on all these points is uncertain and admits to interpretation. However, while developments in the labour market in relation to consumption have weakened the cohesion of labour as a working class, corresponding developments that serve to strengthen the ascendancy of capital should not be ignored.
Institutional change
The second issue reinforces the significance of capital through developments at the institutional level which allow the ruling class to articulate its interests more effectively. Modern governments have tended to produce organisational arrangements which are vulnerable to influence by special interest lobbying. Over recent years an administration seeking to achieve rapid change with the minimum of conflict has distanced government from the democratic process. This has been achieved through the privatisation of policy delivery, the use of internal markets responding to an accountancy rather than a representational logic and the expansion of quangos operating at arms length from Whitehall departments (Savage et al., 1994, pp. 20-9) .
Stuart Weir charts the recent expansion of quangos. The great majority of the 6,328 he lists are service delivery agencies (grantmaintained schools, further and higher education institutions, housing associations, NHS trusts and so on). However, many of the 358 recognised non-departmental public bodies such as the Funding Agency for Schools and the Housing Corporation distribute large sums of public money. Only about half publish annual reports or accounts and no more than one-third are subject to the Open Government code which requires them to make material available to the public (Weir, 1995) .
This approach creates bodies which act as foci for particular interests. Lobbying at the level of the quango or the Whitehall department is becoming increasingly sophisticated alongside the more obviously partial parliamentary lobbying (Jones et al., 1991, pp. 373-7) . Developments in the European Union which reflect the well-established process of interest lobbying in the United States offer an interesting parallel at the international level. EU policy-making often appears to operate as a process of liaison with particular organised interests. The system is 'a form of disjointed pluralism' in which 'interest associations…compete for attention with national states, subnational regions, large firms, and specialised lobbyists, leaving their constituents with a wide range of choices among different paths of access to the EC's political centre and enabling them to use threats of exit to coerce their representatives into a pluralist responsiveness ' (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991, p. 159) . Examples of the significance of organised interest groups in lobbying are the Common Agricultural Policy, the development of interest 'cartels' in social policy (Room, 1994) , the acquiescence in opt-outs to the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty and the dilution of the EU's social policy from Green Paper to White Paper to Action Plan, so that the final stress is on consultation and information sharing (EU, 1995b) .
In general, it is likely that the stronger role accorded to organised interests will favour those groups with most resources, and these will tend to represent the interests of capital. It is difficult to point to particular instances of the influence of capital in lobbying in the social policy arena. Employers' interests seem to be well represented in recent policy-making in relation to the implementation of Statutory Sick Pay (Dean, 1993, pp. 93-5) and the abolition of Wages Councils (Farnham and Lupton, 1994, p. 103 ). The limited controls over private pension funds and the dilution of the requirement to guarantee adequate pensions to a 'minimum solvency requirement' for the fund in the Pensions Bill currently under consideration, seem to point in the same direction.
These political developments at the national and the European level indicate that government is becoming more rather than less significant and that it is increasingly remote from citizens. The structure of the state has implications for the capacity of different groups to represent their interests and to achieve policies that serve their needs. Post-fordist social change has weakened labour and strengthened capital, which points to a shift in the balance of class power rather than the dissolution of class as a category.
G L O B A L I S AT I O N A N D G OV E R N M E N T
Post-fordist approaches argue that the importance of international communications and trade diminishes the significance of the nationstate as a cultural and political focus. International contacts smooth the rigidities of cultural difference. Goods are sold in a world market. Governments cannot effectively manage their own economic and social policies without respecting the constraints of the imperative of competitiveness.
Globalisation may involve 'the dissolution' of 'geographical constraints on social and cultural arrangements' (Waters, 1995, p. 3) . However, the argument that 'contemporary patterns of industrial restructuring…point in the direction of a globalisation of production and corporate reach ' (Amin, 1994, p. 25) does not necessarily imply that the state is of declining importance. Such arguments may apply with particular force to Europe -imports and exports combined account for about 44 per cent of the total European GDP, as against 16 per cent for Japan and 17 per cent for the US (OECD, 1994c, Table 63 ). However, studies of international trade flows indicate that while 'the trend towards more openness, expressed in real terms, is observable in virtually all OECD countries' patterns of trade are not globally uniform. OECD trade has been characterised by a rising degree of intra-regional trade -trade between countries in the European region has grown faster than trade between Europe and other OECD countries, and trade between the US and Canada has also increased at a faster pace' (OECD, 1994c, p. 41) . The internationalisation of markets may be interpreted as setting the groundwork for a system of power blocs rather than one of free exchange.
The question of the significance of nation-states in their responses to international market pressures is of particular interest to social policy, especially when economic 'globalisation' is used to justify policy restructuring. While the international conditions within which welfare states operate may be increasingly similar and beyond the control of individual governments, responses appear to be influenced by national factors -the balance of political interests sedimented in the current pattern of institutions. Esping-Andersen's model of the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) is well known. In more recent work (for example 1994a, 1994b) he argues that the different systems vary in their response to the increased pressures of international competition. Essentially, liberal regimes have pursued deregulatory market-driven approaches, social democratic regimes have sought to retain high levels of employment and universal provision and the corporatist regimes have preserved the standards of the workforce by strengthening the divisions between those in employment and the rest of the population. To this may be added the developing welfare systems of East and Central Europe, the Pacific Basin and South America. In Europe the previous state socialist welfare systems have collapsed and it is unclear what will emerge to replace them. The challenges in the more recently developed countries concern the capacity to reconcile investment in a more productive workforce with family and occupationally based social protection.
Alongside frameworks based on the formal economy and welfare stratification are analyses that concentrate on the relation of welfare systems to non-marketed work and the position of women. Lewis and Ostner distinguish 'strong male breadwinner' welfare states and moderate and weak breadwinner regimes (1994) depending on the extent to which state intervention reduces women's dependence on male employment. The degree of 'defamilialisation' has strong implications for the impact of shifts in employment.
Differences in national welfare arrangements affect both the opportunities open to governments in the face of international competition and the political responses that make policies feasible. In a recent paper, Ian Gough summarises evidence that 'regime differences impact on some aspects of economic performance ' (1995, p. 21 ). The evidence indicates that different approaches may have particular niches in an increasingly competitive international economic system. Both liberal market systems exemplified by the US and the highly centralised Scandinavian systems perform relatively well in producing jobs whereas those in between are less successful (Calmfors and Driffil, 1988) . There is some evidence that a similar pattern applies to the link between welfare and competitiveness. Pfaller, Gough and Therborn distinguish between competition on quality which requires high welfare spending to invest in human capital and competition on price which goes with lower spending and cheap labour costs (1991) . Both may be viable strategies, but intermediate positions may be less tenable.
Similarly, in a recent literature review of work on the impact of state welfare on economic competition, Atkinson concludes that:
An important role is played by the institutional structure of the welfare state. The form of benefits and the conditions under which they are claimed can change their impact on economic behaviour. The same level of total spending may have different implications for the level of GDP or the long-run growth rate depending on the entitlement structure. Switching to targeted benefits or to private provision may replace one set of disincentives by another. Economists cannot ignore what may appear to be issues of detail. (1995, p. 46) These arguments imply that the significance of globalisation in constraining the range of welfare choices open to governments may be exaggerated in the post-fordist literature. Globalisation does not necessarily imply that nation-states are no longer important foci of welfare policy. Countries respond to the imperatives of competition in different ways.
The discussion of the new sociology of welfare suggests that despite change there are strong continuities in patterns of inequality, that developments at the level of government give organised groups, and especially those that represent capital, greater influence on decisionmaking; and that the nation-state can still play a part in a globalising economic system in the different responses to challenges to welfare that national arrangements permit. In short, while trends to diversity, fragmentation and globalisation exist, structures of inequality, the power of capital and state welfare policies matter. What are the implications for social policy?
These points imply that alongside trends to fragmentation and diversity there is still considerable continuity in the structures that influence access to resources to meet needs. Social policy analysis must continue to take account of these. Three are of particular significance.
First, market inequalities are growing. It is a mark of real progress in social policy analysis that the existence and intersection of different structures of inequality associated with gender, ethnicity, disability, age sexuality, region, literacy and other factors is increasingly recognised.
The power inequalities of different groups cannot be read off from their market position. However, the importance of market position is that it is pre-eminently and invariably linked to interest. Trends to greater income inequality and to privatisation in social policy make market position more rather than less important.
The link between social class, market position and life-chances was defined by Weber as follows.
We may speak of a class when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life-chances; in so far as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour markets. (Weber in Gerth and Mills, 1948, p. 141) There are many problems with contemporary operationalisms of class. Most importantly, the class schema currently available have not been successful at analysing the market position of women. This is hardly surprising since they have been devised with other interests in mindfor example, Goldthorpe's concern with male social mobility (1987, p. 40) or Ohlin Wright's with Marxist relations of exploitation (Crompton, 1993, pp. 69-74 ) -and do not generalise readily to other contexts.
Market position remains the chief determinant of individual command over resources over time, as Titmuss (1974, p. 29) phrased the central concern of social policy. Access to resources is of increasing significance. Changing governmental structures tend to allow greater influence to the groups able to lobby persuasively, as private welfare encroaches on state provision and as social policy drifts away from universalism to an investment approach that may discriminate between people as social investments. The recent ESRC review of social classifications concluded that there is 'complete unanimity' among academics, government departments and the private sector that an OPCS occupational classification must be maintained in order to allow the measurement of trends and the comparison of different groups, areas and cohorts (Rose, 1995, p. vi) . The notion of class needs to be rethought rather than abandoned.
Secondly, the nation-state is still of considerable relevance to social policy debate, for two reasons. First, different governmental structures permit different responses to global economic forces. The imperative of globalisation does not drive all nations equally in the same direction. Secondly, current changes to decision-making structures within the state require attention. Many contemporary changes divert rather than diminish the power of government. The increased use of private sector delivery mechanisms shifts the emphasis onto the regulatory state, and the stronger role for quangos reduces the influence of elected representatives. It is the operation of these structures that decides whether the voices of different interests and, in particular, of the most needy groups are heard.
Thirdly, the power of capital in a world where capitalist market systems are increasingly dominant must be seen as of central importance. The ascendancy of arguments that emphasise the overarching significance of international competitiveness in social policy, so that the bottom line of policy debate is the justification of welfare as investment in human capital, brings this home forcefully. It also draws attention to the point that it is differences in the policy structures of the nationstate that provide the opportunities for resistance and progress. The examination of these structures must remain at the heart of any approach to social policy, alongside analysis of expanding market inequalities.
C O N C L U S I O N
The new sociology of social change presents a picture of social life as increasingly characterised by globalism, fragmentation and diversity. The new welfarism, built on this structure, suggests that global competition erodes the significance of nation-states, that recognition of the pluralism of interests means that market inequalities are simply one among many policy terrains and that the decline in significance of social class divisions has removed the labourist political coalition that would support the welfare state in industrial society. The old welfarist goals of full employment plus universal services are neither valuable nor feasible. The welfare state becomes a mechanism for investment in human capital.
These arguments are partial. However, differences in national welfare regimes still offer the best hope of resisting the capacity of international market forces to drive down wages to the lowest global level. The inequalities of work and of the market are still of central importance. If the working class is fragmented, the ruling class is organised, well aware of its own interests and increasingly able to use the institutional structure of government to express them. The leading approaches to social welfare stress social change and post-fordism. It would be unfortunate if the 'second-best' theories of state, capital and class were lost to view in celebration of the dark glamour of the first division in the new sociology of welfare.
